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INTRODUCTION 
The judiciary are different than you and me, not just be-
cause they have life tenure, but because they spend years being 
petitioned by real people. A judge therefore does not face prob-
lems as a logistician or an academic does but instead faces a 
demand to do something for someone, based on events preced-
ing. The resulting posture of decision tends to bring something 
out, something Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once described as 
“the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life.”1 
We can learn more about this “secret root” of the common 
law decision-making from Richard Posner’s career, for he made 
his calling the addressing of hard problems from both an aca-
demic and judicial posture. When it came to copyright law (the 
subject of this Essay), he was a leading advocate of an economic 
approach to the law and even specified what he thought with 
some doctrinal specificity. Hence the natural experiment: What 
would happen when Posner came to face decades of actual cases? 
What might be the effect, if any, of judging?  
In 1981, the year Posner was confirmed, it would have been 
easy to predict how he would decide copyright cases. The  
economic approach had suggested a straightforward, even for-
mulaic approach. Recognize a clear property right; and then 
make sure it is well protected, easy to transfer, and ideally in 
the hands of whoever might use it best. This prescription, to be 
sure, was one Posner was willing to follow in some cases. But as 
a prediction, it failed. For over the arc of his career it cannot be 
denied that Posner’s copyright decisions came, over time, to be 
strongly influenced not just by the questions presented but the 
posture of the cases and, most of all, what he was being asked to 
do and for whom. 
 
 † Julius Silver Professor of Law, Science, and Technology at Columbia Law School. 
 1 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law 34 (Belknap 2009) (originally pub-
lished 1881). 
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Maybe we can put it this way. If Posner never fully lost his 
faith in economics, he did seem to lose faith in humanity’s capac-
ity to behave itself. In other words, as a judge he increasingly re-
jected any Coasian presumption as to how private parties  
behave—namely, efficiently—in exchange for a view suspicious 
of litigants as overreaching, misbehaving creatures who, left 
alone, would have the law defeat its own purposes. When it 
came to copyright, that perspective led to the unlikely emer-
gence of Richard Posner as one of the nation’s leading policemen 
of the parasites, overreachers, and self-enrichers that he saw as 
a plague on the copyright system and intellectual property more 
generally.  
In this sense, his copyright decisions seem far less driven by 
any doctrinal theory as opposed to a teleological mindset. He 
was dedicated to achieving the goals of the law—in this case, 
rewarding legitimate creators and leaving space for others. And 
as he tacked toward that goal, trimming and adjusting the law 
along the way, it became clear that he ultimately put his faith in 
Justice Holmes or perhaps Aristotle rather than Professors 
Ronald Coase or H.L.A. Hart. Stated another way, he clearly be-
lieved that a great judge ought to rely on that internal, uncon-
scious divining rod comprising his own judgment, evolving and 
learning from experience, gradually moving the law closer to its 
stated aspirations. 
To witness Posner’s evolution and the development of his 
copyright jurisprudence provides an opportunity (or an excuse) 
for broader comment. For I hope that this Symposium on  
Posner’s judicial work product will help us understand his par-
ticular contribution to the common law tradition. It is striking 
that even for matters on which he had opined as an academic, 
he remained committed to the judicial approach and its slow 
progress toward the law’s goals, even if it meant throwing away 
what he had said earlier in an academic setting. He took  
Emerson’s quip about “foolish consistency”2 and made it into a 
judicial philosophy. When Posner was at his best, he saw the job 
as an opportunity to work on interesting or amusing problems in 
the law in an effort to improve it. He trusted that internal divin-
ing rod, accepting and even embracing an evolving jurispru-
dence as a sign of learning and wisdom. 
 
 2 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, in Edna H.L. Turpin, ed, Essays of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson 79, 89 (Charles E. Merrill 1907).  
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Understanding Posner as a great common law judge is 
important in an age when that ideal has been all but replaced 
with something different. The newer ideal takes dogmatism as a 
virtue, positing the judge as more of a soldier, who primarily 
earns honor by striking blows for his or her side. He or she is 
less celebrated for evolution or wisdom as opposed to steadfast 
refusal to change his or her views. It embraces a thin ideal of 
individuality: one that allows a judge a taste for baseball or 
bluegrass but forbids individuality when it comes to actual 
judging, at least for important cases. 
The rise of the soldier judge gives reason to fear that  
Posner’s judicial writing may be wasted on our tedious and ten-
dentious times. For activists on the left and right, proponents 
and opponents of doctrine, Posner was always dissatisfying, for 
he rarely delivered the goods in a manner that either side found 
fully acceptable. Nor was he particularly popular with practicing 
lawyers, most of whom have long discarded the pretense of being 
part of a learned profession in the historic sense. The lawyer’s 
jammed schedule creates an appetite for opinions that are easy 
to read, announce neat formulas for future decisions, and com-
bine the trappings of respectability with the depth of a children’s 
textbook. 
It is a pity, for while a judiciary comprised entirely of  
Posners would not be ideal, we have gone too far in the opposite 
direction.3 We need more judges who rely on their judgment, es-
pecially on the courts of appeals, and who try hard to improve 
the law and prevent its misuse. What is hard to admit is that 
there seems to be very little possibility of the next Richard  
Posner becoming a member of the federal judiciary at this point, 
which is a harsh verdict on the state of the Republic. For, espe-
cially in the law, we live in a time in which we celebrate the in-
dividual but recoil from any real instantiation of individuality. 
And that may be why, by the very end, Posner was a common 
law coelacanth, the last fish surviving from the Jurassic period, 
largely swimming alone. 
 
 3 See Frank B. Cross and Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on  
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 Nw U L Rev 1437, 1439–40 (2001) (noting that law 
schools teach a naïve legal model that does not acknowledge a role for judicial  
individuality). 
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I.  COPYRIGHT, ACCORDING TO POSNER THE ACADEMIC AND 
POSNER THE JUDGE 
A.  Posner the Academic 
As an academic, Posner was and is an influential writer in 
the copyright field. He is the author of two books on the topic 
(including his popular title The Little Book of Plagiarism4), along 
with several articles and some blog posts. While copyright was 
certainly not his sole focus (nothing was; he was also like Justice 
Holmes in this regard), his works, most of which were coau-
thored with Professor William Landes, immediately became 
standard citations for the economic analysis of copyright law.5 
The theme of his early work was unsurprising: it was to stress 
the economic, as opposed to the moral, function of copyright. As 
he and Landes put it, they were interested in whether “copy-
right law can be explained as a means for promoting efficient al-
location of resources.”6 
In Posner’s first paper on copyright, published in 1989, he 
and Landes presented a more sophisticated take on what is now 
a standard idea: that copyright grants legal protections to en-
courage the creation of expressive works.7 As they put it, “Copy-
right protection—the right of the copyright’s owner to prevent 
others from making copies—trades off the costs of limiting ac-
cess to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to 
create the work in the first place.”8 But from the beginning,  
Posner also agreed that the task was complex: “For copyright 
law to promote economic efficiency, its principal legal doctrines 
must, at least approximately, maximize the benefits from creat-
ing additional works minus both the losses from limiting access 
and the costs of administering copyright protection.”9 
 
 4 Richard A. Posner, The Little Book of Plagiarism (Pantheon 2007). 
 5 See, for example, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325, 325–33, 344–53 (1989); William M. 
Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U Chi L Rev 471, 
473–75 (2003); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law 37 (Belknap 2003); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, 
The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law 8 (AEI-Brookings 2004). See also 
William F. Patry and Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of 
Eldred, 92 Cal L Rev 1639, 1643 (2004). 
 6 Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 325 (cited in note 5). 
 7 Id at 332. 
 8 Id at 326. 
 9 Id. 
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Of course, by the late 1980s, the central economic paradox 
created by copyright was not unrecognized. It was implicit in 
Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay’s 1841 speech that described 
copyright as a form of monopoly—“a tax on readers for the pur-
pose of giving a bounty to writers.”10 But with a few exceptions 
(among them a famous paper by then-Professor Stephen Breyer 
that questioned the very existence of copyright11), most of the 
writings began and ended with Macaulay’s analysis. Posner and 
Landes’s contribution was to be far more precise about what 
they took to be the various costs associated with both the repro-
duction of expressive works and their creation.12 And they also 
thought copyright protection could go too far, for “beyond some 
level copyright protection may actually be counterproductive by 
raising the cost of expression.”13 However, consistent with  
Posner’s earlier tendency to find an efficiency rationale lurking 
behind most of positive law, in his examination of copyright doc-
trine, he did not suggest that the rules were random or interest 
group driven but rather that they reflected some inchoate yearn-
ing for efficient outcomes.14 
This academic writing set the stage for Posner’s judicial ca-
reer, to which I now turn. 
B.  Posner the Judge 
Posner the academic had presented a flat, almost purposely 
dry account of copyright’s function in the economy. But Posner 
the judge was another story. Perhaps it was the cases, or the 
way he thought about things, but his judicial copyright career 
was far more colorful. And while it is hard to summarize twenty-
six-odd cases, his most prominent contributions dwelt on a key 
 
 10 A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons on the 5th of February, 1841, in The 
Miscellaneous Writings and Speeches of Lord Macaulay 609, 613 (Longmans, Green, 
Reader & Dyer 1871). 
 11 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv L Rev 281, 321 (1970). 
 12 Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 332 (cited in note 5). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 98 (Little, Brown 1973) (“The 
common law method is to allocate responsibilities between people engaged in interacting 
activities in such a way as to maximize the joint value, or, what amounts to the same 
thing, minimize the joint cost of the activities.”). By 2004, Posner had begun to suggest 
that the expansion of copyright was a function of interest group behavior, an assertion in 
tension with the older suggestions of efficiency. See Landes and Posner, Political  
Economy of Intellectual Property at 8 (cited in note 5). 
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relationship: that between primary and secondary authors, or 
what can be described as the problem of “follow-on” works. 
To understand this problem, consider that any successful 
work—a play, a sculpture, a novel—is likely to yield follow-on 
works, such as movie versions, reviews, sequels that use the 
same characters, guides, translations, parodies, and so on. That 
fact yields a challenging question for copyright law—namely, 
which follow-ons should belong to the original author and which 
should be free to secondary authors to create without permis-
sion? Anyone is free to stage Hamlet, but what about writing a 
new Sherlock Holmes story? These cases put the judge in the 
difficult position of weighing the interests of two intended bene-
ficiaries of the law. 
Copyright law handles this area imperfectly and inconsist-
ently with a mixture of doctrines. One is the “idea-expression” 
dichotomy, which allows authors to borrow any “ideas” from ex-
isting works but not the “expression.”15 Posner the academic de-
scribed it this way: “If an economist reprints Ronald Coase’s ar-
ticle on social cost without permission, he is an infringer; but if 
he expounds the Coase Theorem in his own words, he is not.”16 
Another doctrine, important for fictional works, is the granting 
of copyright in characters, which allows an author to control the 
franchise and merchandizing.17 A third doctrine is the adapta-
tion or derivative work right, which gives the original author the 
right to any adaptation of the original (like a film version of a 
novel)18 or any other way that it might be “recast, transformed, 
or adapted.”19 The fourth and final doctrine is the fair use doc-
trine, which creates an affirmative defense for certain types of 
follow-ons, such as reviews or parodies.20 Hence a critic is free, 
under the fair use doctrine, to write a lengthy review of a nonfic-
tion book and even to quote liberally from it, even though there 
 
 15 See 17 USC § 102(a)–(b). 
 16 Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law at 91 (cited 
in note 5). 
 17 See, for example, Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of 
Copyright, 125 Harv L Rev 683, 742–50 (2012) (discussing character copyright and a no-
table Posner opinion on the topic). 
 18 See generally Amy B. Cohen, When Does a Work Infringe the Derivative Works 
Right of a Copyright Owner?, 17 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 623 (1999) (delving into the 
intricacies of the doctrine). 
 19 17 USC § 101. 
 20 See, for example, Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil  
Society, 106 Yale L J 283, 304 (1996). 
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could be no review without the book and even though the origi-
nal author hates the review and wishes it did not exist. 
Posner the judge would go on to make important contribu-
tions to the character copyright doctrine, primarily through his 
writing on characters, derivative works, and fair use. 
II.  CHARACTER COPYRIGHTS 
Sherlock Holmes, Dorothy (from The Wizard of Oz), and 
Medieval Hellspawn are the featured characters in Posner’s 
most important copyright opinions, which center on the role of 
character copyrights.21 
Copyright is designed to encourage the creation of “works,” 
which was originally understood as “maps, charts, and books.”22 
But at some point, possibly in the 1920s, it became clear that 
the characters in a fictional work might enjoy their own copy-
rights.23 That is to say, it became clear that a character might 
enjoy a legal life separate from the work it was found in.24 That 
idea was most evident in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, 
who, by declining to protect stock characters, implied that others 
might be protected.25 
If once trivial, character copyrights have grown in value and 
become perhaps the most valuable class of copyright. No one 
remembers the plot of the first comic to feature Superman, but 
everyone knows “The Man of Steel.” A film like The Avengers, 
has a value that owes little to the originality of its setting or plot 
(a villain is plotting to take over the world) as opposed to the in-
clusion of luminous heroes like Thor, Iron Man, the Hulk, and 
Black Widow. 
Over his tenure, Posner assigned himself or was assigned 
just about every character copyright case to come before the 
Seventh Circuit. His decisions are a good place to witness the  
 
 21 Klinger v Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd, 755 F3d 496 (7th Cir 2014) (Klinger I);  
Gracen v Bradford Exchange, 698 F2d 300 (7th Cir 1983); Gaiman v McFarlane, 360 F3d 
644 (7th Cir 2004). 
 22 Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat 124, 124. 
 23 See, for example, King Features Syndicate v Fleischer, 299 F 533, 535 (2d Cir 
1924) (holding that a doll version of a cartoon horse violated copyright protection, and 
noting that taking the substance of a work or an idea and producing it in a different me-
dium still violated copyright protection). 
 24 For an explanation that relies on the role played by characters in infringement 
analysis, see Zahr K. Said, Fixing Copyright in Characters: Literary Perspectives on a 
Legal Problem, 35 Cardozo L Rev 769, 776–80 (2013). 
 25 See Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp, 45 F2d 119, 121 (1930). 
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effect of judging, for the decisions, while reflecting the competi-
tive and economic consequences of granting character copyright, 
are driven also by insights about the process of authorship itself 
and rumination on just what a character is. Ultimately, the 
judgments cannot seem to be divorced from the justice of the 
situation—who was trying to get what and how entitled to relief 
they seemed. 
Posner’s first character-related copyright decision came very 
early in his career and centered on Dorothy from The Wizard of 
Oz.26 The case revolved around a woman named Jorie Gracen, 
who had won a contest to paint Dorothy as portrayed by Judy 
Garland for a series of collectors’ plates.27 Gracen could not 
reach an agreement to reproduce her painting with the manu-
facturer that MGM had licensed to make the plates, so the 
manufacturer hired another artist to copy Gracen’s painting, 
reasoning that Gracen did not hold any enforceable rights any-
how.28 She felt differently and sued for infringement.29 
But had Gracen actually copied the character of Dorothy? 
Posner might have decided the case by holding that Dorothy was 
nothing more than a stock character, a courageous but otherwise 
unremarkable little girl from Kansas whose taste for shiny 
shoes did not distinguish her. But he presumed that the charac-
ter was copyrighted because, foreshadowing Posner’s later work 
on visual characters, she was depicted in a still photograph of 
Judy Garland as Dorothy from the MGM film.30 
But this, as Posner might say, was an aside. Posner’s far 
more important and influential character opinion was a tricky 
case centered on the Spawn comic book series, the famous au-
thor Neil Gaiman, and the artist/publisher Todd McFarlane.31 It 
is both an important case and also one in which the line between 
 
 26 See Gracen, 698 F2d at 305. 
 27 Id at 301. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id at 301–02. 
 30 The Gracen opinion is also important for its elevation of problems of evidence 
and proof in copyright law. In adopting a Second Circuit rule demanding greater origi-
nality in derivative works, Posner noticed that such requirements kept at bay what 
might otherwise become difficult problems of proof. Gracen, 698 F2d at 301–02. And this 
way of thinking about the law, implicit perhaps in other opinions, was novel as a ra-
tionale for a copyright rule. Professor Douglas Lichtman would later elevate it to a more 
general theory of copyright law, suggesting that the evidentiary function helped judges 
understand many otherwise puzzling parts of copyright doctrine. Douglas Lichtman, 
Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 Duke L J 683, 708–10 (2003). 
 31 Gaiman, 360 F3d at 648–49. 
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Posner’s economic and pragmatic instincts seems particularly 
sharp. 
Comic author and illustrator McFarlane, who made his 
name through his work on Spider-Man in the late 1980s, had by 
the 1990s left the majors (DC and Marvel) to become an inde-
pendent comic book publisher.32 In 1992, he launched a new se-
ries centered on a character named Spawn, whose life story, 
Judge Posner tells us, “is an affecting one.”33 Spawn (whose  
given name was Al) was a member of an elite military unit who 
was betrayed and killed after uncovering a dark conspiracy.34 
However, Spawn made a literal deal with the devil to return to 
Earth and became a “handpicked Hellspawn . . . remade (a full 
makeover, as we’ll see) and infused with Hell-born energy.”35 
Spawn the character clearly belonged to McFarlane, who 
conceived him and first drew him. (In his first appearance, he 
had long spiky fingernails, wore a red cape and chains, and ma-
nipulated green energy fields.) The complications began in 1992, 
when McFarlane invited Gaiman to write an issue of the Spawn 
series based on only an oral promise to treat him better than the 
“big guys.”36 Gaiman immediately added three new characters to 
the comic, naming them Medieval Spawn, Angela, and Count 
Nicholas Cogliostro, and wrote dialogue for them.37 Medieval 
Spawn was an earlier incarnation of the main character de-
scribed above—like the original, he also wore a red cape and 
chains, but carried gigantic medieval weapons and rode a 
horse.38 Angela was a new villain, a “warrior angel and villain” 
who wore a dominatrix outfit and carried a lance.39 Cogliostro 
was a “wisened [sic] sage.”40 To complicate matters, while the 
characters were thought up by Gaiman, they were actually 
drawn by McFarlane.41 All of the new characters, particularly 
Angela, were popular and became valuable, and over time the 
Gaiman-McFarlane team began to argue over who actually 
owned copyright in the newly created characters. McFarlane 
 
 32 Id at 649. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Gaiman, 360 F3d at 649. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id at 650. 
 38 Id at 657. 
 39 Gaiman, 360 F3d at 657. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id at 658. 
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conceded that Gaiman was a joint owner of Angela but not the 
other two.42 They could not agree, ultimately leading to litigation. 
One way that a simple law-and-economics analysis might be 
used to approach this problem is simply as one of asset alloca-
tion. Consider that the three characters—Medieval Spawn,  
Angela, and Cogliostro—can be seen as little more than new  
assets spawned by the original work, like three calves born of 
the same cow.43 It is a typical dictate in the economic analysis of 
law to suggest simple rules, clear to the parties ex ante, that al-
locate the assets to whoever might most easily put them to pro-
ductive use.44 In this case, the party who would put the assets to 
the most productive use was clearly McFarlane, the publisher 
and also the originator of the Spawn series. Another approach is 
to create rights around which private bargains could be struck, 
in Coasian fashion. Professor Harold Demsetz argued that the 
economic function of property was to grant rights so as to inter-
nalize any externalities45—well, what else was Gaiman’s effort 
to grab the characters for himself? Hence the case for leaving 
the assets with the original rights holder and allowing parties to 
contract around that reality if they wished. 
Following these principles, Posner could have just reversed 
the jury verdict and told Gaiman that he should have gotten a 
signed contract and to not bother the court with his pleas for ex 
post justice. That outcome might have reflected a classic 
Coasian refrain: having strengthened the rights, the lesson 
would be learned, and future parties would surely understand 
the necessity of bargaining in advance to reach a Pareto optimal 
outcome.46 
But Posner declined to write that opinion. Instead, he took 
the occasion for a detailed dive into the nuances of creative  
collaboration and the challenging common law question of what 
might make a character distinct enough to merit copyright pro-
tection. The opinion took Gaiman’s side, in part because  
 
 42 Id at 650. 
 43 See Randall G. Holcombe, The Coase Theorem, Applied to Markets and  
Government, 23 Indep Rev 249, 250–51 (2018) (discussing asset allocation as applied to 
markets). 
 44 See id. 
 45 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347, 
350 (1967). 
 46 Pareto optimality refers to a situation of asset allocation in which it is impossible to 
move resources around to make any one individual better off without making another 
worse off. See, for example, Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 348–49 (cited in note 5). 
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Posner seemed to take him seriously as a creator who deserved 
the rewards of the law.47 In short, Posner discarded any 
“[s]imple rules for a complex world”48 in favor of who anyone 
could see was a meritorious author, the actual subject of the 
copyright laws. 
Finding that Gaiman was the copyright owner required sev-
eral doctrinal innovations (and also giving Gaiman a pass on a 
tricky statute of limitations challenge49). One doctrinal innova-
tion concerned the joint ownership of copyright. Other circuits, 
including the Second, had created a simple rule suggesting that 
one could not be a joint author without making a contribution 
that was separately copyrightable and, in fact, Posner himself 
had stated a version of that rule in an earlier case.50 It is a rule 
meant to prevent more minor figures—copy editors, fact-
checkers, and others—from claiming to be joint authors of the 
works to which they contribute.51 It therefore left an easy way to 
knock Gaiman out and send a message of tough love: next time, 
get a contract. 
But Posner, himself a frequent coauthor, was not willing to 
accept a rule that took so narrow a view of what counted as an 
authorial contribution (one that would deny his own coauthor, 
Professor Landes, joint copyright). So Posner held that,  
whatever the merits of that rule in other contexts, it went too far 
if it denied joint copyright when combined efforts were necessary 
to produce one work—for that would be “peeling the onion until 
it disappeared.”52 He suggested: 
Here is a typical case from academe. One professor has bril-
liant ideas but can’t write; another is an excellent writer, 
but his ideas are commonplace. So they collaborate on an 
academic article, one contributing the ideas, which are not 
copyrightable, and the other the prose envelope. . . . Their 
intent to be the joint owners of the copyright in the article 
would be plain, and that should be enough to constitute 
them joint authors.53 
 
 47 See Gaiman, 360 F3d at 654–55. 
 48 Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 21 (Harvard 1995). 
 49 See Gaiman, 360 F3d at 652–53. 
 50 Seshadri v Kasraian, 130 F3d 798, 803 (7th Cir 1997), citing Childress v Taylor, 
945 F2d 500, 507 (2d Cir 1991). 
 51 See Thomson v Larson, 147 F3d 195, 200 (2d Cir 1998). 
 52 Gaiman, 360 F3d at 658–59. 
 53 Id at 659. 
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This ruling made Gaiman a joint owner of Medieval 
Spawn.54 But Posner also faced the assertion that Cogliostro, 
“the wisened [sic] sage,” was merely a stock figure and therefore 
not subject to ownership by anyone.55 I have already discussed 
the fact that in some works, such as The Avengers or, for that 
matter, the James Bond films, the characters are “the story be-
ing told,” meaning that the stories amount to little more than 
the characters in them.56 But there are also successful works 
that have no memorable or copyrightable characters. Jurassic 
Park was a popular film, but the only characters of note were 
the dinosaurs, who could not be copyrighted as such. Pulp  
Fiction was among the most acclaimed films of the 1990s, but, 
as the title suggests, every one of its characters was stock or, 
more accurately, did not go much beyond the actors who played 
them. 
Posner took the opportunity to follow Judge Learned Hand’s 
lead and put his own gloss on the standard that a character be 
distinctive.57 Judge Hand wrote that there could be no copyright 
in “a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the 
household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous 
of his mistress.”58 Posner took the opportunity to extend Judge 
Hand’s Shakespeare-centered list of unprotectable characters by 
adding “a drunken suburban housewife, a gesticulating 
Frenchman, a fire-breathing dragon, a talking cat, a Prussian 
officer who wears a monocle and clicks his heels, [or] a masked 
magician.”59 
But then what of Cogliostro, a stock character if there ever 
was one? Here’s how Gaiman conceived of him: “[Y]ou think he’s 
a drunken bum,” but “[h]e’s some kind of mysterious stranger 
who knows things.”60 There was some visual description too: “[A] 
really old bum, a skinny, balding old man, with a grubby  
greyish-yellow beard, like a skinny santa claus.”61 Even with all 
of that, we don’t have much, almost certainly not enough to pro-
tect. The “unexpectedly knowledgeable old wino” would, on its 
 
 54 Id at 661–62. 
 55 Id at 657, 660. 
 56 Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc, v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, 216 F2d 
945, 950 (9th Cir 1954). 
 57 See Nichols, 45 F2d at 121. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Gaiman, 360 F3d at 660. 
 60 Id at 658. 
 61 Id. 
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face, seem to be a good addition to Judge Hand’s and Posner’s 
list of stock characters.62 
But instead of reversing on Cogliostro, Posner made yet  
another innovative doctrinal move. He decided that McFarlane, 
in the process of giving Cogliostro a specific and distinct appear-
ance (when drawing him), crossed the line and made Cogliostro 
into a copyrightable character, of which Gaiman was now the 
joint owner.63 Along the way, Posner made explicit and implicit 
distinctions between the copyrightability of visual and literary 
characters.64 
Posner seemed to be driven by the subtle differences be-
tween a visual and written medium that were also implicit in 
the Dorothy/Wizard of Oz case and were also captured by what I 
call the “King Lear/Grimace paradox.”65 Most of us would con-
sider King Lear a more interesting and well-developed character 
than, say, Grimace, the purple McDonald’s mascot. But to copy-
right law, Grimace’s depiction makes him the more distinct 
character, and the easier one to gain protection for, as compared 
with Lear, who might be described as “a wealthy but angry old 
father with a weakness for flattery.” Here is how Posner put the 
point: “A reader of unillustrated fiction completes the work in 
his mind; the reader of a comic book or the viewer of a movie is 
passive.”66 He added a public service message: “That is why kids 
lose a lot when they don’t read fiction, even when the movies 
and television that they watch are aesthetically superior.”67 
The Cogliostro decision might have been wrong and was 
surely a close call. It seems to create the risk of encouraging  
actors to claim copyright in characters that they visually em-
body (consider Mark Hamill claiming ownership in Luke  
Skywalker).68 It also might seem to overcredit Gaiman, who, af-
ter all, hadn’t really done much besides give the description 
above and write some dialogue. Yet it certainly marked, for  
 
 62 Id at 660. 
 63 Gaiman, 360 F3d at 661. 
 64 The distinction was arguably implicit in decisions such as Walt Disney  
Productions v Air Pirates, 581 F2d 751, 753–55 (9th Cir 1978). 
 65 The paradox is one that I use in my copyright class. 
 66 Gaiman, 360 F3d at 661. 
 67 Id. 
 68 But see Garcia v Google, Inc, 786 F3d 733, 737 (9th Cir 2015) (en banc) (affirm-
ing the district court’s decision to deny relief to an actress seeking to copyright her per-
formance in a film). 
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Posner, a decidedly more nuanced and sophisticated approach to 
follow-on authorship cases, echoed in his academic writing.  
It might be worth noting that, at around the same time as 
the Hellspawn opinion, Posner released a book, The Economic 
Structure of Intellectual Property Law,69 and a monograph, The 
Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law.70 In the latter, 
implicitly breaking with the earlier premise that the law was ef-
ficient, he dwelt on public choice explanations for copyright’s ex-
pansion and the “inherent asymmetry” between the primary and 
secondary authors, based on the difference between “the value 
that creators of intellectual property place on having property 
rights and the value that would-be copiers place on the freedom 
to copy without having to obtain a license.”71 So perhaps he was 
beginning to have his suspicions. 
Posner’s latent concerns about the conduct of copyright 
owners played out most dramatically in the 2014 case of 
Sherlock Holmes, the famous detective, in an opinion with 
particularly important implications for so-called fan fiction and 
other follow-on authorship.72 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, wrote some sixty 
Sherlock Holmes stories.73 By the 2010s, copyright in all but ten 
of the stories had expired.74 Nonetheless, when other authors 
sought to use those characters, the estate demanded royalties, 
claiming that it still owned copyright in the characters of 
Sherlock Holmes and John Watson, his sidekick.75 An editor of a 
series of new Sherlock Holmes stories sued Doyle’s estate, 
asking the court to declare Sherlock and Watson to be in the 
public domain.76 
You might wonder: If the copyrights had expired, how could 
the estate possibly claim copyright in the characters? The estate 
posited that the characters had fully developed only in the last 
ten stories—the ones in which copyright still subsisted—because 
in these last stories, the characters had become “round,” unlike 
 
 69 See generally Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Intellectual Property 
Law (cited in note 5). 
 70 See generally Landes and Posner, Political Economy of Intellectual Property  
(cited in note 5). 
 71 Id at 14. 
 72 Klinger I, 755 F3d at 498. 
 73 Id at 497. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id at 497–98. 
 76 Klinger I, 755 F3d at 498. 
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the “flatter” Holmes and Watson who were in the first fifty.77 
“Repeatedly at the oral argument,” Posner wrote, “the estate’s 
lawyer dramatized the concept of a ‘round’ character by describ-
ing large circles with his arms.”78 Hence, according to the estate, 
the further delineation of the characters in the last ten stories 
either kept them in copyright or created copyright in them for 
the first time. This argument suggested that further develop-
ment might even do so indefinitely should the estate continue to 
write new Sherlock Holmes stories every so often.79 
While that might sound like overreaching, the estate’s 
strongest policy arguments could be found in a 2003 paper by 
none other than Posner himself and coauthor Landes.80 The two 
made the novel argument—blasphemous to the copyright acad-
emy—that there might be good economic reason to allow certain 
copyrights, such as those of famous characters, to subsist indefi-
nitely.81 Using the example of Mickey Mouse, Posner and Landes 
argued that a valuable character thrown into the public domain 
might become “overgrazed” and lose all commercial value.82 
If because copyright had expired anyone were free to incor-
porate the Mickey Mouse character in a book, movie, song, 
etc., the value of the character might plummet. Not only 
would the public rapidly tire of Mickey Mouse, but his im-
age would be blurred, as some authors portrayed him as a 
Casanova, others as catmeat, others as an animal-rights 
advocate, still others as the henpecked husband of Minnie. 
In effect, there would be both a movement along and shift 
downward in the demand curve . . . until Mickey Mouse’s 
commercial value was zero.83 
It is no stretch to suggest that such overgrazing might ruin 
Sherlock Holmes; hence Posner’s paper clearly counsels for de-
ciding in the estate’s favor. But Posner the judge effectively de-
cided against Posner the academic. He ruled against the estate, 
suggesting that its defense “border[ed] on the quixotic”84 and 
even forced it to pay attorneys’ fees.  
 
 77 Id at 501–02. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id at 503. 
 80 Landes and Posner, 70 U Chi L Rev at 474–75 (cited in note 5). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id at 484. 
 83 Id at 487–88.  
 84 See Klinger I, 755 F3d at 503. 
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Facing a choice between legitimate follow-on authors 
wishing to put Sherlock Holmes in new adventures and an 
estate demanding money that would not go to Doyle himself, 
who was long dead, Posner the judge did not see it as a hard 
case. Instead, it was outrageous overreaching—copyright 
trolling.85 (In his award of attorney fees, he went on at some 
length about the problem of copyright trolls extorting money on 
the basis of nothing.86) 
But what about the argument made by Posner the 
academic?87 Perhaps out of a sense of duty, Posner raised his 
own theory, without citation,88 as an argument against his own 
opinion that the estate could have argued but didn’t. 
We can imagine the Doyle estate being concerned that a 
modern author might write a story in which Sherlock 
Holmes was disparaged (perhaps by being depicted as a 
drug dealer—he was of course a cocaine user—or as an idiot 
detective like Inspector Clouseau of the Pink Panther 
movies).89 
But Posner the judge summarily dismissed the arguments of 
Posner the academic by pointing out that the argument lacked 
legal support and, in any case, that the estate was not actually 
concerned about disparaging uses. Whether this is the only time 
Posner the judge dismissed the arguments of Posner the 
academic I do not know, but it was certainly among the clearer 
examples.  
III.  DERIVATIVE WORKS AND FAIR USE 
A second way that the line between the first and later au-
thors is divided is through the twin doctrines of derivative works 
and fair use.90 The former is an exceptionally broad right that 
gives the original author the exclusive rights over any adapta-
tion of the original work—any way it might be “recast, trans-
formed, or adapted.”91 The classic examples were the play based 
 
 85 See id (noting that a lengthy copyright protection period would result in massive 
payments to the Doyle estate in licensing fees). 
 86 See Klinger v Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd, 761 F3d 789, 791–92 (7th Cir 2014) 
(Klinger II). 
 87 Landes and Posner, 70 U Chi L Rev at 475 (cited in note 5). 
 88 Posner did not include citations to his academic writing in his judicial opinions. 
 89 Klinger I, 755 F3d at 503. 
 90 17 USC §§ 106(2), 107. 
 91 17 USC § 101. 
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on the novel, the translation, the new musical arrangement, and 
the abridgment.92 But that right can be in tension, and even 
sometimes at war, with the fair use doctrine, which suggests 
that a secondary author may adapt the work into follow-on 
works, such as book reviews, news reporting, parodies, and, 
more recently, so-called remix art.93 As this brief discussion 
might suggest, what counts as an adaptation, and what is fair 
use, is not exactly a straightforward matter. 
Posner’s second major derivative work case was a 2000 case 
involving the singer Prince (or, as he was then known, “the  
Artist Formerly Known as Prince”) and the symbol that he used 
to represent himself, which is unpronounceable but resembles 
an ankh.94 
FIGURE 1:  SYMBOL CHOSEN BY PRINCE TO REPRESENT HIMSELF 
 
 
 92 17 USC § 101. 
 93 17 USC § 107. 
 94 See generally Pickett v Prince, 207 F3d 402 (7th Cir 2000). 
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FIGURE 2:  GUITAR RESEMBLING PRINCE’S CHOSEN SYMBOL 
 
In that case, a man named Ferdinand Pickett, inspired by 
the symbol, created a guitar in the shape of it.95 According to 
Pickett, he managed to show his guitar to Prince. To his surprise 
and anger, not long thereafter, Prince appeared in public with 
just such a guitar, which suggested to Pickett that his brilliant 
idea had been stolen.96 
Despite the fact that the second man was himself a creator 
in a way, Posner held for Prince without much difficulty.97 The 
law supported such an outcome, but Posner grounded the deci-
sion on a premise drawn from his academic writing: it was sen-
sible to concentrate all rights in Prince, for “[c]oncentrating the 
right to make derivative works in the owner of the original work 
prevents what might otherwise be an endless series of infringe-
ment suits posing insoluble difficulties of proof.”98 It was an echo 
of the Dorothy opinion, and the case became a lesson in the im-
portance of preventing opportunistic litigation by those who (of-
ten in earnest) imagine that they really were the first to come 
 
 95 Id at 404. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id at 407. 
 98 Pickett, 207 F3d at 406. See also id: 
Consider two translations into English of a book originally published in 
French. The two translations are bound to be very similar and it will be 
difficult to establish whether they are very similar because one is a copy of the 
other or because both are copies of the same foreign-language original. 
Whether Prince’s guitar is a copy of his copyrighted symbol or a copy of 
Pickett’s guitar is likewise not a question that the methods of litigation can 
readily answer with confidence. 
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up with, say, the idea that Pygmalion might make a really good 
play. 
But by following that narrative (one stressed in his  
academic writing99), the opinion avoids several important ques-
tions. Was the guitar version clearly an adaptation of Prince’s 
copyrighted symbol and therefore actually even actionable at all, 
whether by Pickett or by Prince? The statute does not so de-
cree,100 and the functional nature of guitars might seem to cau-
tion against it. Might the better answer be to disarm everyone 
who might want to make guitars out of unpronounceable sym-
bols—and just leave copyright out of it? 
It is hard to escape the conclusion that the posture of the 
lawsuit helped drive the result. Famous creators always attract 
a certain class of followers who come to believe that they played 
an overlooked role in the creative process and have been shafted 
by “the powers that be.” J.K. Rowling, the author of the Harry 
Potter series, has been sued repeatedly by authors who believe 
that they, in fact, were the first to invent the concept of school-
children who practice magic. (Among the plaintiffs are the au-
thors of Willy the Wizard and The Legend of Rah and  
Muggles.101) Like a conspiracy theory, the idea that one is the 
“real” inventor of something famous and successful, once em-
bedded in the psyche, seems impossible to dislodge. And while 
we do not know Pickett’s full story, his narrative suggests a man 
who was dangerously close to this category. If given rights, he 
might become like the dog in Justice Holmes’s The Common 
Law, who “will not allow himself to be dispossessed, either by 
force or fraud, of what he holds, without trying to get it back 
again.”102 
Things might have been different were Pickett a harmless 
hobbyist, a designer of curio guitars who had been hunted down 
by Prince or, even worse, the Prince estate. And this difference 
helps explain the famous Beanie Baby case, Ty, Inc v  
Publications International, Ltd (Ty II),103 decided three years 
later. Beanie Babies are small stuffed animals that, in the 
 
 99 See, for example, Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Intellectual Property 
Law at 109–11 (cited in note 5). 
 100 17 USC § 103(a). 
 101 See, for example, Harry Potter Author Sued for Plagiarism (The Guardian, Mar 
17, 2000), archived at http://perma.cc/U4GC-MWAZ; J.K. Rowling Sued for Plagiarism 
(The Star, Feb 18, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/X3AC-HLYY. 
 102 Holmes, The Common Law at 192 (cited in note 1). 
 103 292 F3d 512 (7th Cir 2002). 
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1990s, became popular collectors’ items.104 They are manufac-
tured by Ty, Inc and, in an earlier case, Posner had upheld  
copyright of one of Ty’s pigs, named “Squealer,” as a “soft sculp-
ture.”105 Publications International, Ltd (PIL), a publisher, pro-
duced a series of independent guides to the Beanie Babies collec-
tion, which included the Beanie Babies Collector’s Guide and For 
the Love of Beanie Babies.106 But Ty didn’t like PIL’s unlicensed 
guides, for it granted copyright licenses to publishers for a com-
peting set of guides, in which criticism of the Beanie Babies was 
forbidden; and Ty sued PIL for copyright infringement.107 
The Beanie Baby case is Posner’s most important contribu-
tion to the problem of follow-on authorship. It works one eco-
nomic concept to great advantage: the idea that some follow-ons 
are complements to the original work—that is, they make it 
more valuable. Consider, for example, Internet recaps of televi-
sion shows or a layman’s guide to Professor Martin Heidegger’s 
Being and Time—both add value to the original work as opposed 
to substituting for it. Posner took the view that follow-ons that 
make the original more valuable, as opposed to substituting for 
it, ought to be permitted. In fact, in Ty II, Posner casually ele-
vated the distinction between complement and substitute into a 
controlling theory for fair use. “[W]e may say,” and Posner does, 
“that copying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in 
the sense that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but 
copying that is a substitute for the copyrighted work (in the sense 
that nails are substitutes for pegs or screws) . . . is not fair use.”108 
Posner’s complement/substitute line is an elegant formula-
tion that, in a sentence or two, would create a new order for a 
doctrine that is widely regarded as unpredictable and chaotic. 
Unfortunately, it is only barely consistent with what other 
courts (including the Supreme Court) have prescribed for fair 
use cases—namely, a methodical working through of four factors 
specified in the statute.109 Posner, who hates nothing more than 
an incoherent balancing test in which factors are said to “point” 
one way or another (like a lawyer’s Ouija board), dealt with that 
 
 104 Id at 515. 
 105 Ty, Inc v GMA Accessories, Inc, 132 F3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir 1997) (Ty I).  
 106 Ty II, 292 F3d at 515. 
 107 Id at 520. 
 108 Id at 517. 
 109 See 17 USC § 107; Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 US 569, 577 (1994). 
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problem by announcing that “the four factors are a checklist of 
things to be considered rather than a formula for decision.”110 
Whether other circuits will be bold enough to accept  
Posner’s complement/substitute approach remains to be seen, as 
the four-factor analysis he hated has an almost magnetic appeal 
for some judges and academics. And there’s also another prob-
lem with Posner’s complement/substitute approach. Many of the 
adaptation or derivative work rights—granted to the original 
creator by the statute—are also complements to the original 
work. But if complements are supposed to be fair use, how can 
they also be derivative works? (Consider that a translation of 
Harry Potter into Japanese also makes the original more valua-
ble because more people can read it—but the law clearly makes 
translations a derivative work.) 
Posner addresses this by saying that works that substitute 
for derivative works of the original are also not usually to be re-
garded as fair use either. But it leaves open the question of what 
counts as a derivative work in the first place—a matter that 
Posner, along with Judge Frank Easterbrook, has been among 
the few judges to really think hard about.111 
That leads us to Posner’s second innovation in Ty II: a nar-
rowing of the derivative works doctrine from what at least some 
courts had taken it to be. He achieves this by a categorical hold-
ing that a collector’s guide to a series of copyrighted works are 
not derivative works at all, a matter important to the world of 
follow-on writing. Posner seems to have forced this concession on 
Ty’s lawyers, for he seemed to take it as obvious, comparing the 
collector’s guide to a book review.112 Posner said, relying on the 
statutory language: 
A guide to Parisian restaurants is not a recasting, trans-
forming, or adapting of Parisian restaurants. Indeed, a col-
lectors’ guide is very much like a book review, which is a 
guide to a book and which no one supposes is a derivative 
work. Both the book review and the collectors’ guide are 
critical and evaluative as well as purely informational; and 
ownership of a copyright does not confer a legal right to con-
trol public evaluation of the copyrighted work.113 
 
 110 Ty II, 292 F3d at 522. 
 111 See, for example, Lee v A.R.T. Co, 125 F3d 580, 581 (7th Cir 1997) (Easterbrook). 
 112 Ty II, 292 F3d at 520. 
 113 Id at 520–21. 
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This way of thinking breaks from other courts, which have 
sometimes been willing to blithely assume that anything associ-
ated with the original work belongs to the original author, even 
though the statutory language doesn’t say so. The Second  
Circuit held a trivia game based on the television show Seinfeld 
to be infringing,114 even though a trivia game is not mentioned in 
the statute and it is hard to see it as “recast[ing], transform[ing], 
or adapt[ing]”115 the original show. It is hard, if not impossible, 
to see how the game hurts the creators of the show and easy to 
see that it might add to the enjoyment of die-hard fans. The 
same court also held a guidebook to the Twin Peaks television 
show, which was popular in the early 1990s, to be a derivative 
work,116 and a New York district court held an answer book to a 
mathematics textbook to be a derivative work.117 
But Posner broke hard with all of these decisions by holding 
guides not to be derivatives of the original work, a view that has 
had an influence over prominent cases.118 This, the better view of 
the derivative work doctrine, remains important for the various 
online encyclopedias that now seem to follow every popular  
novel, film, or television show, and also for the Internet recaps 
that are beloved by some television fans. 
And so a victory for the collector’s guide but a loss for the 
guitar maker. As they say in law school, how can these cases be 
distinguished? It ought not be overlooked that, in the Prince 
case, Pickett wasn’t the defendant—rather, he was trying to get 
money out of Prince for purportedly stealing his design for the 
guitar. In contrast, Ty’s campaign against PIL was unsympa-
thetic in numerous ways. Ty is revealed to be the overreaching 
 
 114 Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc v Carol Publishing Group, Inc, 150 F3d 132, 139 
(2d Cir 1998). Posner’s effort to distinguish the case is tortured because he struggles to 
understand why the Second Circuit viewed the trivia game at issue in that case as 
frivolous. 
 115 17 USC § 101. 
 116 Twin Peaks Productions, Inc v Publications International, Ltd, 996 F2d 1366, 
1373 (2d Cir 1993). 
 117 Addison-Wesley Publishing Co v Brown, 223 F Supp 219, 220 (EDNY 1963). See 
also Worlds of Wonder, Inc v Vector Intercontinental, Inc, 653 F Supp 135, 139–40 (ND 
Ohio 1986); Worlds of Wonder, Inc v Veritel Learning Systems, Inc, 658 F Supp 351, 355–
56 (ND Tex 1986). 
 118 His approach to derivative works would later be followed over circuit precedent 
in the Second Circuit in a well-publicized case centered on The Lexicon, a fan-written 
guidebook about the world of Harry Potter. See Warner Brothers Entertainment Inc v 
RDR Books, 575 F Supp 2d 513, 519–22, 538–39 (SDNY 2008), quoting Ty II, 292 F3d at 
521. See also Tim Wu, Fan Feud (New Yorker, May 12, 2008), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5RWN-SYZR. 
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villain, the monopolist of the micro–teddy bear market, silencing 
its critics and eliminating its competitors, its steel fist obscured 
by velvet and stuffing. 
“Ty doesn’t like criticism,” Posner said at one point,119 and 
he also took pains to point out that while Ty does license guides, 
it retains veto rights over the text and requires its licensees to 
print a misleading statement on their guides that indicates that 
the publication is not affiliated with Ty.120 Such deception, which 
might be a minor violation of consumer protection laws,121 
prompted Posner to mention the doctrine of copyright misuse 
and the threat of stripping Ty’s copyrights altogether.122 
These criticisms of Ty’s behavior are of a piece with other 
copyright opinions and a later Posner theme: the punishment 
and shaming of overreaching rights holders. The Sherlock 
Holmes opinions discussed earlier put the estate in a very 
unflattering light by portraying it as trolling for dollars on the 
back of an expired copyright. The same can be found in Posner’s 
later patent decisions and, notably, in the case of Apple, Inc v 
Motorola, Inc.123 In that case, sitting as a district judge, Posner 
dismissed all of the patent claims with prejudice in an opinion 
that chastised both parties and questioned the patent system 
itself.124 And in another copyright case, Posner heaped scorn on a 
firm named Assessment Technologies, which had tried to use a 
software copyright to control valuable data that was not 
copyrightable.125 It was nothing, he wrote, but a situation in 
which an “owner is trying to secrete the data in its copyrighted 
program,” and “[i]t would be appalling if such an attempt could 
succeed.”126 
CONCLUSION 
So there we have it. Posner’s earlier copyright opinions are 
marked by a sensitivity to some of the subtler costs in the copy-
right system. In his later opinions, Posner slowly grew into a  
 
 119 Ty II, 292 F3d at 520. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat 717, 719 (1914), codified as amended 
at 15 USC § 45(a)(1). 
 122 Ty II, 292 F3d at 520. 
 123 869 F Supp 2d 901 (ND Ill 2012). 
 124 Id at 908–10, 916–20. 
 125 Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v WIREdata, Inc, 350 F3d 640, 641–42 (7th 
Cir 2003). 
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policeman of the public domain and an enemy of copyright trolls 
and lazy estates. But even as he became a critic of the way in 
which intellectual property was being used, it remains that 
Richard Posner never came to lose his basic faith in granting 
property rights to authors, based on the basic economic argu-
ments that favor propertization. Instead, what his exposure to 
the cases seemed to destroy was any faith that Coasian bargain-
ing in this context would inevitably yield efficient outcomes.  
To the author Posner once said (speaking of a well known 
academic figure), “He’s not very smart—but he does know a lot.” 
That grudging respect captures something both about Posner 
and the effects of judging on him. For despite his intelligence 
and capacity for abstract reasoning, he grew to gain respect for 
the kind of knowledge that is the product of lengthy immersion 
in something, and judging, for him, was just such an immersion 
in the unusual world of American litigation. In time, he felt he 
began to know more about why people brought lawsuits, and 
thereby gained a different and more nuanced sense of who was 
deserving of judicial solicitude and who deserved a dressing 
down. As for the latter, Posner always held a special kind of dis-
dain for those who combined their self-interest with claims of an 
infallibility more common in religious settings. That is what 
made inevitable the collision between himself and certain hold-
ers of intellectual property. 
 
